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Must We Do What We Say? 
Truth, Responsibility and the Ordinary in Ancient and Modern
Perfectionism
Daniele Lorenzini
“What I must do is all that concerns me, not what
the people think. This rule, equally arduous in
actual and in intellectual life, may serve for the
whole distinction between greatness and
meanness.”
R. W. Emerson, Self-Reliance
 
I. Ancient Perfectionism
“All That Concerns Me” is My Everyday Life
1 My central argument in this paper will be that moral perfectionism cannot be understood
in its radical philosophical, ethical and political dimensions unless we trace its tradition
back to the ancient Greek conception of philosophy as a way of life. Hence, to begin, I will
argue that the Emersonian maxim quoted above, “what I must do is all that concerns me,
not what the people think,”1 far from being simply a Romantic, self-centered claim of the
uniqueness and value of the individual, constitutes on the contrary the reactivation of a
more ancient principle, which resides at the very basis of the Western philosophical
tradition. Ancient philosophy is in fact entirely traversed by the imperative of separating
carefully what does concern us, because it is in our power, from what does not, precisely
because it is not in our power. It is the well-known ancient struggle of man against the
unpredictability of Fate (Tyche),  which takes the form of a series of typical couples of
opposites  –  soul  versus  body,  inward  goods  versus  outward  goods,  knowledge  versus 
opinion, wise man versus common man, etc. The purpose of these pairs of opposites is
clear: defining, within the framework of human life, a space that is separate from the
dominance of Fate, in which man can consequently find his ‘truth’ (what is essential to
him), his autonomy and his freedom – in a word, the place of human happiness. Ancient
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philosophy, then, is a matter of what matters, a matter of knowing what matters for me
and being able to construct my conduct and life on this basis.
2 This  fundamental  feature  of  ancient  philosophy  is  particularly  evident  in  Stoic
philosophy, founded – as it is well known – on a preliminary distinction between what is
in  our  power  and what  is  not.  A  theoretical  distinction  that  the  Stoics  translate
immediately into a practical rule: what matters for us, because it is in our power, is only
moral good or evil – that is, doing the (moral) good and avoiding to do the (moral) evil.
Everything else, strictly speaking, does not matter for us (because it is not in our power),
and so it must be considered indifferent. The opening chapter of the Manual of Epictetus is
very explicit on this:
Of  things,  some  are  in  our  power,  and  others  are  not.  In  our  power  are:
discernment, impulsion to act, desire, aversion and, in a word, whatever are our
own acts. Not in our power are the body, property, reputation, public offices and, in
a word, whatever are not our own acts. And the things in our power are by nature
free, not subject to restraint, nor hindrance; but the things not in our power are
weak, slavish, subject to restraint, in the control of others. Remember then that if
you think the things which are by nature slavish to be free, and the things which
are in the power of others to be your own, you will be hindered in your action, you
will  lament,  you  will  be  disturbed,  you  will  blame both  gods  and  men.  On  the
contrary, if you think that only which is your own to be your own, and if you think
that what is another’s, as it really is, belongs to another, no man will ever compel
you, no man will hinder you, you will never blame anyone, you will accuse no one,
you will do nothing against your will, no one will harm you, you will have no enemy
– for you will not suffer any harm.2 
3 Manifestly,  it  is  not  just  a  matter  of  theoretical  knowledge.  On  the  contrary,  Stoic
philosophy incites men to learn and memorize a set of essential principles, which aim to
govern in detail the practice of their everyday life. Therefore, these rational principles of
behaviour do not have to remain at the level of logos, of pure discourse, but rather (to use
Michel Foucault’s  words) they have to be “subjectivated” through a series of  specific
“ascetic techniques,”3 in order to make them coincide with the ethos of the subject – that
is,  in  order  to  orient  his  practical  conduct.4 Hence,  following Pierre  Hadot,  we shall
conceive  ancient  philosophy essentially  as  a  choice and a  way of  life,  rather  than a
theoretical  discourse.  Or better,  in ancient  philosophy,  theoretical  discourse is  never
considered an end in itself, but it is always clearly and decidedly put in the service of
practice, i.e. of a certain way of living and being.5 Ancient philosophy is “an exercise of
the thought, will, and the totality of one’s being,” it is “a method of spiritual progress,”
which  demands  “a  radical  conversion  and  transformation  of  the  individual’s  way  of
being.” Its goal is the achievement of a definite existential state: wisdom.6 Following these
suggestions, in the first lecture of L’herméneutique du sujet, Foucault defines ‘spirituality’
(as opposed to ‘philosophy’) as “the search, practice and experience through which the
subject carries out the necessary transformations on himself in order to have access to
the truth”7 or, as he says in an later interview, to have access to a certain mode of being.8
Hence, Foucault speaks of ‘spirituality’ when it is the life of man – not in its biological
sense (zoé), but rather in its ethical, political and social sense (bios) – that becomes the
main  object  of  his  care  (epimeleia),  as  well  as  the  real  stake  (enjeu) of  his  work  of
transformation and transfiguration practiced on himself.
4 This is why the ancient philosopher is someone who, despite what other people think and
do (and ergo, despite the risk of being considered odd), does not miss the importance of his
everyday life. On the contrary, he cares for his life – for every single, low and apparently
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meaningless detail of it – because his life is precisely what concerns him, what matters for
him, what deserves all  his attention and ethical work. As Emerson says,  the (arduous)
application of  this distinction between what concerns me and what the people think
allows  us  to  discriminate  “between  greatness  and  meanness,”  that  is,  between
philosophers  –  who take seriously the fundamental  question of  ancient  ethics,  “How
ought I to live?”9 – and other people, who fail to notice the importance and practical
consequences of such a question. This rule, according to Emerson, is so arduous to apply
because “it is easy in the world to live after the world’s opinion,” as it is easy “in solitude
to live after our own”; but “the great man” is only “he who in the midst of the crowd keeps
with perfect sweetness the independence of solitude”10 – a solitude that, consequently,
“must not be mechanical, but spiritual, that is, must be elevation.”11 In other words, and
to bring this rule to its utmost consequences: since the social virtue most requested is
conformity,  “whoso would be  a  man,  must  be  a  nonconformist.”12 Which is  also  the
coherent conclusion of ancient philosophy understood as ‘spirituality’ (i.e. a way of life),
as Foucault clearly shows in his 1984 lectures at the Collège de France, dedicated to the
figure of Socrates and, later, to ancient Cynicism.
 
On the (Perfectionist) Relation Between Words and Deeds
5 Plato’s Laches is the fundamental text to consider if we want to understand how Socrates’
philosophical discourse, his practice of truth-telling (parrhesia), can be combined with his
effort to care for the meanest details of his everyday life. In fact, the “style of life,” the
“form that we give to life,” constitute the essential object of Socratic parrhesia:13 as Nicias
explains, in the Laches,  Socrates’  interlocutor is always “led by the Socratic logos into
‘giving an account’ (didonai logon) of ‘himself, of the manner in which he now spends his
days, and of the kind of life he has lived hitherto’.”14 ‘Giving an account’ of ourselves
means, then, ‘giving an account’ of the way we live and, in order to do it, “submitting”
our life “to a touchstone, to a test (épreuve) which enables us to distinguish the good we
have done from the evil we have done, in the course of our existence.”15 In this way, it is
possible to examine and determine the true nature of the relation between words (logoi)
and life (bios), since Socrates asks his interlocutor to demonstrate precisely whether he is
able to show the harmony between the rational discourse he uses and the way in which
he lives. Here, the touchstone (basanos) to test such a harmony, i.e. “the degree of accord
between a person’s life and its principle of intelligibility,”16 is  not constituted by the
homologia  understood  as  agreement  between  the  discourses  (logoi) of  two  or  more
interlocutors – as in the Gorgias.17 The basanos is rather represented by Socrates himself,
who manifests through his way of living a perfectly harmonic relation, a perfect homologia
, between his words and his deeds:
Socrates is able to use rational, ethically valuable, fine, and beautiful discourse; but
unlike  the  sophist,  he  can use  parrhesia  and speak freely  because  what  he  says
accords exactly with what he thinks, and what he thinks accords exactly with what
he does.18
6 We are confronted, here, with a twofold principle of harmony: Socrates is fully responsible
for his words and his deeds, because both accord perfectly with what he thinks. Hence, the
way of life emerges in Socratic parrhesia as something we have to take care of, but which
we have to submit, during the entire course of our existence, to a test, to a touch-stone
that enables us to discriminate between good and evil. Indeed, the principle of homologia 
exposed in the Laches is based on the “harmony,” on the “symphony”19 – established
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within the (practical) framework of a style of life – between logos and ethos, logos and bios.
This harmony constitutes also the sign, the mark that makes Socrates’ parrhesia possible,
allowing him to speak frankly and to call into question the existence, the way of life of his
fellow citizens – that is to say: this harmony between logos and ethos has a value which is,
at the same time, ethical and political. It is not by chance that, during an interview at
Berkeley, Foucault claims that what interests him, what matters for him, is “politics as an
ethics” – as an ethos, a way of life.
I  do not conclude from this that one may say just anything within the order of
theory, but, on the contrary, that a demanding, prudent, ‘experimental’ attitude is
necessary; at every moment, step by step, one must confront what one is thinking
and saying with what one is doing, with what one is. […] The key to the personal
politic attitude of a philosopher is not to be sought in his ideas, as if it could be
deduced from them, but rather in his philosophy-as-life, in his philosophical life,
his ethos.20
7 To sum up, the ancient paradigm of (ethical and political) responsibility consists in the
endless work of oneself on oneself, in the endless task of forging a harmonic relation
between the words we ordinarily use and our everyday life – and Socrates is the key
figure that embodies this paradigm. In particular, according to Foucault, the Laches is to
be considered the starting point of  “a whole philosophical  practice and activity,  and
Cynicism is  obviously  the  main  example  of  it.”21 However,  as  I  have  already  shown
elsewhere,22 the Cynic philosopher radicalizes the Socratic relation between logos and bios,
and builds  up his  life  in the form of  a  paradoxical transfiguration of  the traditional
philosophical life – that is, in the form of a “life other” (vie autre), which continuously calls
into question the lives of  others,  using the weapon of  a scandalous ethos,  instead of  a
parrhesiastic  discourse.23 Thus,  with Cynicism the ‘nonconformist  side’  of  the Socratic
principle  of  harmony  breaks  out,  and  the  philosophical  life  fully  becomes  a
“manifestation of the truth.”24 This manifestation of the truth is not abstract, it does not
take place in the realm of pure theory, but rather within the everyday life of the Cynic
philosopher, through his ordinary choices and the way he dresses and speaks:
To live philosophically is to show the truth through the ethos (the way one lives),
the  way  one  reacts  (to  a  situation,  a  scene,  when confronted  with  a  particular
situation),  and obviously the doctrine one teaches;  it  is  to show the truth in all
these aspects and through these vehicles (ethos of the scene, kairos of the situation,
and doctrine).25
8 However, in order to transfigure his life into such a manifestation of the truth (alèthurgie),
in order to denounce and attack the common life of conformity and transform it into a
“true life” (vraie vie), the Cynic philosopher has to undertake an endless ethical practice
on himself, on his words and deeds, on every single detail of his way of life. Hence, the
Cynic manifestation of the truth is nothing more – but nothing less! – than a courageous,
scandalous  and public  manifestation of  his  (extra)ordinary  way of  life.  Through this
ethical  work,  the Cynic philosopher learns how to assume his  ordinary gestures and
words,  even the smallest  and apparently  meaningless ones,  as  the  real  object  of  his
attention and care. In this way, he builds up his everyday life as a touchstone for the lives
of others, who claim the same theoretical principles (logoi), but do not allow them to forge
(and be embodied in) their very ethos.
[Cynicism]  transforms  the  form of  existence  in  an  essential  condition  of  truth-
telling.  It  transforms  the  form of  existence  in  the  reducing  practice  (pratique
réductrice) which will leave room for truth-telling. It finally transforms the form of
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existence in a way of showing, in the gestures, in the body, in the way of dressing,
in the way of behaving (se conduire) and living, truth itself.26
9 Thus, with Cynicism, we really come across the paradigm of a radical form of resistance.
The Cynic philosopher, in fact, does not limit himself to the valorisation of his everyday
life and the (consequent) reversal of common values; on the contrary, he builds up his
everyday life as a “militant” practice of opposition to the existing established power. He
transfigures the everyday of his life, he makes it the site of perpetual risk (the risk of
truth-telling, or truth-living) and the core of his radical criticism of every form of social
conformity. As Foucault says baldly, Cynic (true) life is a form of “explicit, voluntary and
constant aggression towards humanity in general,” aiming “to change it,” to change its
“moral attitude (its ethos)” but, at the same time, to change also “its habits, its customs,
its ways of living.”27 It is an aggression towards society (and world) as they are, in order
to give rise to a society (and a world) “other.” Cynicism is then the matrix of a form of life
that does not aim merely “to show what the world is in its truth,” but rather “to show
that the world will not reach its truth, will not transfigure and become other to attain
what it is in its truth, unless through a change, a complete alteration – that is, the change
and complete alteration in the relation of oneself with oneself.”28
10 Indeed, as Foucault claims in La vie des hommes infâmes,29 if we must consider our everyday
life important,  it is precisely because it constitutes the main field of struggle – always
uncertain and unsteady – between “power relations” and “practices of resistance.” In
other words, ancient perfectionism shows us something still relevant: our everyday life
matters not only in an ethical, but also in a political sense, and the work of oneself on
oneself, applied even to the meanest details of the ordinary dimension of our words and
deeds,  really  forms  the  fundamental  core  of  every  social  and  political  practice  of
resistance that aims to be effective.
 
‘Truth’ as an Event and a Practice
11 Before considering modern perfectionism, however, we might ask what kind of truth we
are facing, when we consider ancient philosophy in its perfectionist task of ethical self-
transformation and radical struggle against conformity. According to Foucault, in fact, it
is possible to identify a significant rupture that took place between ancient and modern
conceptions of truth:
It  would be interesting to compare Greek parrhesia  with the modern (Cartesian)
conception of  evidence.  For since Descartes,  the coincidence between belief  and
truth  is  obtained  in  a  certain  (mental)  evidential  experience.  For  the  Greeks,
however, the coincidence between belief and truth does not take place in a (mental)
experience, but in a verbal activity, namely, parrhesia.30
12 Since the epistemological  model  of  evidence  plays  a  fundamental  (and founding)  role
within the framework of  modern philosophical  inquiry,  these  words  mean also  that,
according to Foucault, there is a discontinuity between ancient and modern conceptions of
philosophy itself.  Stanley Cavell  expresses almost the same idea when he writes that
“after a millennium or so in which philosophy, as established in Greece, carried on the
idea of philosophy as a way of life, constituted in view of the (perfectionist) task of caring
for the self,” there has been “another millennium or so in which philosophy has seemed
prepared to discard this piece of its mission.”31 We can find a very similar historical
description also in the works  of  Hadot,  in  particular  where he marks  the difference
between “philosophical  discourse”  and “philosophy.” According to  him,  the essential
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turning  point  of  this  history  is  represented  by  Medieval  Scholasticism  and  by  the
inclusion of philosophy in the cursus studiorum of the (recently born) universities: as a
result of such an inclusion, in fact, philosophy becomes an institutional discipline to be
taught, locked-up in the realm of theoretical abstraction, without any connection with
what it has been in the ancient world – namely, a concrete attitude, an actual choice of
existence, an ascetic work of self-transformation, a way of seeing the world and acting in
it.32 To  use  (again)  a  Foucauldian  vocabulary,  after  Scholasticism and the  “Cartesian
moment,” philosophy – which, in the ancient world, had always been linked with the task
of ‘spirituality’ – accepted and adopted the epistemological structure of science, claiming
that the subject can have access to truth through a simple act of knowledge, which no
longer has to do with his mode of being.33 Thus, the epistemological truth became the 
model for philosophical truth-telling, which in turn became a truthtelling on science –
“telling the truth of truth” (dire-vrai du vrai) – more and more detached from ordinary
language and everyday life, and from the ethical techniques that ancient philosophers
used to shape (and transfigure) them.34
13 Indeed, in ancient world, truth was closer to a model that Foucault calls “truth-event,” as
opposed precisely  to  “truth-demonstration” –  that  is,  to  the modern epistemological
conception  of  truth.  Whereas  the  latter  is  “ubiquitous”  (the  question  of  truth  is  a
question it  is  always  possible  to  pose,  and in relation to  everything)  and “universally
accessible” (because, in principle, “no one is exclusively qualified” and no one is a priori
disqualified “to state the truth”),35 the former is a “dispersed, discontinuous, interrupted
truth which will only speak or appear from time to time, where it wishes to, in certain
places” – a truth which has “its favorable moments, its propitious places, its privileged
agents and bearers.” In other words, it is a truth that emerges as an “event.”36
We have, then, two series in the Western history of truth. The series of constant,
constituted, demonstrated, discovered truth, and then a different series of the truth
which does not belong to the order of what is, but to the order of what happens, a
truth, therefore, which is not given in the form of discovery, but in the form of the
event.37
14 As  we  have  seen,  according  to  Foucault,  the  ancient  conception  of  truth  cannot  be
associated with any particular mental state of the subject – and, therefore, it is not a
truth- demonstration. It is rather conceived as an event, emerging from the agreement
among  the  logoi  of  different  interlocutors  (Plato’s  Gorgias),  or  from  the  harmony
established  and  concretely  showed,  by  an  individual,  between  his  logos  and  his  ethos 
(Socratic parrhesia), or – directly and paradoxically – from the way of life itself (Cynicism).
Anyhow, if  we consider ancient philosophy in the light of  our perfectionist  work on
ourselves and our ordinary words and life, it becomes manifest that, in such a framework,
truth is not an epistemological concept based on the modern criterion of evidence, but an
ethical practice which takes place in the course of human experience. Indeed, in ancient
Greece, to be a philosopher means to give importance to everyday life and to pay attention 
to the details of common language and behaviour, in order to actively transform oneself
and one’s relationship to others and to the world.  Moreover,  such an ethico-political
transformation of the self marks a sharp distinction between philosophical life and the
lives of other people, since it can be achieved only through a series of specific techniques
that we may call ‘techniques of the ordinary’ – in order to emphasize that they take
ordinary language and life of man as the essential object of their philosophical gaze and
work of transfiguration.38
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15 As we have already observed, this way of conceiving truth and practicing philosophy has
been somehow put aside in modern times. Nevertheless, in what follows I will argue that
the attention to the ordinary and to truth as a practice has survived in the form of a
hidden tradition, and it has been renewed during the last two centuries, primarily but not
exclusively thanks to the transcendental American philosophy of Emerson and Thoreau.
 
II. Modern Perfectionism
The Struggle against Conformity
16 The fundamental question of ancient ethics significantly re-emerges at the beginning of
Emerson’s essay Fate,  and thus it attests a (renewed) perfectionist will not to miss the
importance of the practical question of our way of life:
To me […] the question of the times resolved itself into a practical question of the
conduct of life. How shall I live?39
17 Indeed, for modern (as for ancient) perfectionism, each moral choice concerns the kind of
life we are willing to live and the meaning and value we are ready to attribute to it.
Besides, this is not the sole element of continuity: the theme of criticism, of the struggle
against  social  customs and conformity,  which is  at  the core of  ancient  (Socratic  and
Cynic)  perfectionism,  also  plays  a  central  role  within  the framework  of  modern
perfectionism. In fact, as Emerson shows in Self-Reliance, conformity is still perceived as
one of the main obstacles along the path of perfectionism, precisely since it prevents the
individual  to be self-reliant and to undertake the quest for his better or higher self.
According to Emerson, 
[s]ociety  is  a  joint-stock  company,  in  which  the  members  agree,  for  the  better
securing of his bread to each shareholder, to surrender the liberty and culture of
the eater. The virtue in most request is conformity. Self-reliance is its aversion.40
This is why, as already quoted, whoso would be a man, must be a nonconformist –
that is, he must believe his own thought and, above all, he must believe that what is
true for him in his private heart is true for all men.41 
Here, in this demanding claim that our own private ‘voice,’ if it is expressed on the
basis  of  self-reliance,  should become a public  (and even a universal)  voice,  it  is
possible to find the eminently political dimension of Emersonian perfectionism.42
To one in the state Emerson names self-reliance, every word urged from one in the
state  of  conformity  causes  chagrin,  violates  the  expression  of  our  nature  by
pressing upon us an empty voice, hence would deprive us of participation in the
conversation of justice.43
18 Likewise, Emerson claims that our “genuine” action – the action undertaken on the basis
of  self-reliance  –  will  explain  itself  and our  other  genuine  actions,  but  that,  on  the
contrary, our conformity “explains nothing.”44 Hence, our genuine action is supposed to
operate a transition from the realm of private intelligibility to a universal dimension. We
are not so far from Socratic parrhesia, which courageously claims its truth by relying on
the  harmony  established  between  Socrates’  thoughts  and  his  words  and  deeds.  In
Socrates too the main question is the question of expression, of finding our voice in the
public, political conversation – not the conversation of Athens’ democratic assembly of
citizens,  but  the ordinary,  everyday conversation of  justice,  which represents  the true
political  dimension of  the poli.45 Socratic parrhesia,  as  we have seen,  aims to criticize
conformity and to awaken the interlocutor to the necessity of finding his personal (non-
mimetic) voice within democratic conversation, of caring for himself and of practicing
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virtue – as a result of an actual exercise of attention towards ordinary language and
everyday life. According to Cavell, the aim of Self-Reliance is the same: Emerson’s writing
constitutes an analogon of Socrates’ truth-telling, since it aspires to fight against “society’s
demand for conformity,” through the expression of a person’s thought as “the imperative
to an incessant conversion or refiguration of society’s incessant demands for his consent
– his conforming himself – to its doings.” This is why Emerson’s writing too has to be “the
object of aversion to society’s consciousness.”46 Or better, on the one hand, it must be the
outset of an ethical conversion and transformation, courageously47 operated on ourselves
and our life, since “we must become averse to this conformity, which means convert away
from it, which means transform our conformity, as if we are to be born (again).”48 On the
other, it must function as the propellant for a real revolution,  for a transfiguration of
others,  of  society  and  the  entire  world,  which  is  very  close  to  Cynic  revolution  (as
Foucault describes it):
It is easy to see that a greater self-reliance must work a revolution in all the offices and
relations of men; in their religion; in their education; in their pursuits; their modes of
living; their association; in their property; in their speculative views.49
19 Emerson’s self-reliance is an attitude all  at once ethical and political,  which does not
consist in the (unlikely) discovery of ‘the self’ as the ultimate place for us to rest and feel
safe, but rather in the creation of a new relation of ourselves to ourselves, the others and
the entire world. This attitude is exercised through the attention to the words of our
ordinary life,50 through the importance we must recognize in them and, consequently,
through a “self-transformation” that aims to attain “the further or higher self of each”
(an infinite, never concluded task).51 At the same time, this attitude is traversed by the
contrast  between imitation (conformity)  and the  exercise  of  individuality.  “Insist  on
yourself; never imitate”52 is, indeed, the essential corollary of Emersonian self-reliance.
This is why it is perhaps possible to consider the work of John Stuart Mill as a part of the
modern perfectionist tradition – and I am thinking especially of On Liberty’s third chapter,
centered,  as  it  is  well  known,  on  individuality,  originality  and  even  eccentricity  as
fundamental  ingredients  of  human  happiness.  In  fact,  according  to  Mill,  “unity  of
opinion, unless resulting from the fullest and freest comparison of opposite opinion, is
not desirable, and diversity not an evil, but a good.” This diversity must function not only
at the level of opinions, but also and above all in relation to our everyday life:
As it is useful that while mankind are imperfect there should be different opinions,
so it is that there should be different experiments of living; that free scope should be
given  to varieties  of  character,  short  of  injury  to  others;  and  that  the  worth  of
different modes of life should be proved practically, when anyone thinks fit to try
them.53 
20 For, where the rule of conduct is not the person’s own character, but social traditions or
customs, “there is wanting one of the principal ingredients of human happiness,  and
quite the chief ingredient of individual and social progress.” Thus, against the “yoke” of
conformity, we must always encourage the free development of individuality, and a wider
exercise of spontaneity and originality: in a society where a very limited (and fixed) set of
accepted models of life exists, indeed, people “should do absolutely nothing but copy one
another” – and, according to Mill (and to Emerson), “he who lets the world, or his own
portion of it, choose his plan of life for him has no need of any other faculty than the ape-
like one of imitation.” On the contrary, “he who chooses his plan for himself employs all
his faculties”: he beautifies and perfects himself, since human nature “is not a machine to
be built after a model, and set to do exactly the work prescribed to it, but a tree, which
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requires to grow and develop itself on all sides, according to the tendency of the inward
forces which make it a living thing.”54 Consequently, there is no reason that “all human
existence should be constructed on some one or some small number of patterns,” but
rather – Mill argues – “different people should be allowed to lead different lives,” since a
person’s own mode of laying out his existence is the best, “not because it is the best in
itself, but because it is his own mode.”55 Therefore, in a sense, “the mere example of non-
conformity, the mere refusal to bend the knee to custom, is itself a service,” also if it does
not propose a better way of living, but merely a different one.
21 Precisely because the tyranny of opinion is such as to make eccentricity a reproach, it is
desirable,  in  order  to  break  through  that  tyranny,  that  people  should  be  eccentric.
Eccentricity has always abounded when and where strength of character has abounded;
and  the  amount  of  eccentricity  in  a  society  has  generally  been  proportional  to  the
amount of genius, mental vigour, and moral courage it contained. That so few now dare to
be eccentric marks the chief danger of the time.56
22 Hence, exercising individuality means daring to take our way of life itself as the object of a
positive  transformation,  in  order  to  find  our  voice  and  engage  ourselves  in  a
(perfectionist)  effort  of  self-improvement.  Moreover,  as  in the case of  Cynicism,  this
effort of self-improvement and transformation is not ‘individualistic’ – if we mean, by this
word, ‘selfish,’ ‘narcissistic.’ On the contrary, it has essentially to do with other people
and with the possibility of building up something like a new “shared” world57 – since it is
the  weapon  we  must  use  to  fight  against  social  conformity,  and  endlessly  call  into
question the others, their empty words and their lives of quiet desperation. This is why
the “philosophical mission” of Mill’s writing, as in the case of Emerson’s, is precisely “to
awaken us to the question he poses,”58 that is to say: it is a critical mission, very close to
the older Cynic one. Indeed, according to Emerson, the fundamental task of thinking is
the reversal of our way of life and the perpetual struggle with (and within) the present,
characterized  by  the  tension  between  society  “as  it  stands”  and  society  “as  it  may
become.”59 Such a  twofold  ethico-political  “pattern of  disappointment  and desire”  is
considered by Cavell as one of (or perhaps the) essential feature of moral perfectionism:
The very conception of a divided self and a doubled world, providing a perspective
of judgement upon the world as it is, measured against the world as it may be, tends
to express disappointment with the world as it is, as the scene of human activity
and  prospects,  and  perhaps  to  lodge  the  demand  or  desire  for  a  reform  or
transfiguration of the world.60 
 
Exemplarity, Responsibility and the Ordinary
23 This struggle for the ethical transfiguration of oneself, which acquires at once a social
and political dimension and which has ancient Cynicism as its (theoretical and practical)
matrix,  can  also  be  discovered  at  work  in  some  of  the  most  important  European
revolutionary movements, or more precisely – as Foucault claims in Le courage de la vérité
–  in  modern  “militancy”  (militantisme),  understood  as  a  specific  form  of  life.61 In
particular, the figure of the Spanish anarchist Buenaventura Durruti, among others, can
help  us  to  analyse  more  deeply  this  close  relation  between  (personal)  ethical
subjectivation  and  the  emergence  of  a  shared  movement  of  resistance  that  aims  to
transform society and the world concretely.
24 As it is known, Durruti was one of the protagonists of the Catalan revolt and the conquest
of Barcelona; more generally he is considered the real anarchic “hero” of the Spanish civil
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war. He was not an intellectual, but a metal-worker who did not write anything, who did
not  leave  (almost)  anything  material  after  his  death.  Therefore,  in  his  (peculiar)
biography of Durruti, Hans Magnus Enzensberger states clearly that we are confronted
with the task of reconstructing the life of a man “whose patrimony consisted in ‘a change
of underwear, two guns, a binoculars and a pair of sunglasses’.”62 That is to say, Durruti’s
life did not express itself in the accumulation of material things, but rather in his deeds –
and,  as a direct  consequence,  for others,  it  became ‘exemplary.’63 Indeed,  if  so many
Spanish workers followed and spontaneously obeyed Durruti, this was precisely because
he did construct and present his (ordinary) life in the form of an example – of an exemplary
life. As the Italian socialist Carlo Rosselli writes, the revolutionary hero is neither chief
nor myth, but rather a man who tries to help the work of social renewal “through the
exemplary renewal  of  himself.”64 It  is  not  by chance,  then,  that  we are assured that
Durruti “lived a life absolutely consonant with his principles,” that he “lived for what he
believed” (in fact, “his ideas were not a hobby for him; on the contrary, he wanted to
translate them into action”), and that we must not look for his “heroism” within the pages
of newspapers, but rather “in his everyday life.”65 For all these reasons, people considered
him as the embodiment of that “faith in a new society” which was deeply rooted in their
hearts too66 – in short, they recognized in him, in his words and life, their own “rejected
thoughts.”67
25 Therefore, through this notion of exemplarity,68 we can concretely link the perfectionist
transformation of ourselves and our everyday life to the struggle aiming to change and
transfigure others,  society and the entire world.  In the construction of his life as an
exemplary life, in fact, Durruti did not suggest that the same construction was useless for
others, he did not prevent others from experiencing such a (personal and always unique)
ethical transformation.  On the contrary,  he emphasized its  necessity and urgency,  its
value as a preliminary step for every further perfectionist effort of revolution: the first
struggle we have to combat is the struggle within ourselves, because “no one has the
reason for this revolution if each of us has not.”69 Indeed, the function of the exemplary
and (extra)ordinary life of Durruti was to show (rather than ‘to teach’) practically that
nothing is necessary as such, nothing is ‘natural’ in human society, and that everything is
important – every ordinary word and gesture has an ethical and political value. Durruti
assumed the responsibility for his words and deeds precisely through the creation of an
(already Socratic) harmony between thoughts, words and life70 – and in this harmony
resides, ultimately, his exemplarity. The construction of a shared world (of struggle, of
resistance) and the perfectionist transformation of ourselves are then nothing but the
two sides of the same coin:
Huge amounts of money passed by the hands of Durruti, and nevertheless I used to
repair his shoe soles with patches, because he did not have enough money to bring
them to the cobbler. […] We used to go to his house, and he was often wearing an
apron, to peel the potatoes: his wife was working. […] The next day, he took his gun
and came down in the street, to face a world of social repression.71
26 Paying attention to the everyday of our words and lives allows us to return to an ordinary 
that is not the place of final rest, of absolute peace, but rather that has to be conceived as
a propellant  for  the perfectionist  transformation of  ourselves,  society and the entire
world. Such an attention can produce, evidently, different consequences, and encourage
different kinds of conduct – but it is essentially the same attention exercised by Thoreau
in refusing to pay his poll  taxes to a government that still  accepted slavery and was
waging war on Mexico. Indeed, in his famous essay on Civil Disobedience,72 Thoreau makes
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it plain that his act of resistance is rooted in his capability to pay attention to the details
of ordinary life, and in his will not to miss their ethico-political value. In a democracy (it
could be said), we can easily use many other legal methods to express our dissent and try
to change things; but this easiness is only an illusion.73 We need to see that every word we
speak and every action we accomplish compromises us, and so requires always a choice –
since, through it, we daily express our consent or dissent to our democratic government.
It is not a matter of seeing something hidden, but rather of being able to see what is
under our eyes, what is so difficult to perceive precisely because of its plainness:
We have long known that the role of philosophy is not to discover what is hidden,
but to render visible what precisely is visible, which is to say, to make appear what
is so close, so immediate, so intimately tied to ourselves that, as a consequence, we
do not perceive it.74
27 This capability to see what is visible, i.e. to pay attention to it, is not natural, but rather a
competence to be acquired through a specific education. Therefore, a work of ethical
(re)construction of ourselves and reshaping of our lives turns out to be necessary to meet
an ordinary which always precedes us, but can never be directly grasped. It is “a task to
come to see the world as it is.”75 Such a task, such work on ourselves, leaves room for the
emergence of the ordinary as an event (as something important for us, something that
matters)  and, consequently,  for  experience  itself  –  for  our  possibility  of  having  an
experience.76 What is at stake here is the construction of an ‘ethics of the ordinary,’ which
is only the other face of a “politics of the ordinary.”77 Indeed, for Thoreau, it is a question
of (political) responsibility: he cannot accept that his government acts unjustly, he feels
compromised, since in a democracy each of  us is responsible for each decision of our
government – ergo, each of us must always keep the possibility to express dissent open
and alive.78
[I]n an encounter over justice, there are sides, or positions, and while there may in
the moment be nothing to do, and nothing further to say, there is still something to
show: say consent or dissent. Responsibility remains a task of responsiveness.79
28 Responsibility  (and disobedience)  remains  a  task  of  responsiveness  through  which
Thoreau tries  to  find his  voice  –  since  “finding my voice  consists  not  in  finding an
agreement with everybody, but in making a claim (revendication).”80 But responsibility (and
disobedience) is also a matter of way of life. Indeed, as it clearly emerges in his essay, it is
not (only)  his  conscience that  Thoreau opposes to his  government,  but  rather – and
directly – his life itself. He asks: “How does it become a man to behave toward this American
government today?” As we can see, such a question concerns essentially the kind of man
one wants to be,  and the kind of  man Thoreau wants to be – he claims – cannot  be
“associated” to a government which is “the slave’s government also.”81 Hence, as a result
of  this  question,  which I  take  to  be  the  perfectionist  question of  Civil  Disobedience,  a
renewed and higher ideal of democracy emerges: ‘democracy’ does not mean to vote,
when we have to, for what we think is right, and then leave the task of managing it to the
majority.  On the contrary,  ‘democracy’  means to take care of the right,  to be “vitally
concerned that that right should prevail,” since “even voting for the right is doing nothing
for it.”82 Therefore, “the mission of perfectionism generally, in a world of false (and false
calls for) democracy, is the discovery of the possibility of democracy, which to exist has
recurrently to be (re)discovered.”83 It is through the touchstone of this ‘democratic’ way of
life that the actions of our democratic government have to be tested, as Thoreau claims
clearly: injustice can be considered a part of “the necessary friction of the machine of
government,” but “if it is of such a nature that it requires you to be the agent of injustice
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to another,  then,  I  say,  break the law.  Let  your  life  be a counter friction to stop the
machine. What I have to do is to see, at any rate, that I do not lend myself to the wrong
which I condemn.”84
29 Here again we can see the legacy of the ancient (perfectionist) idea of the harmony to be
established between what we say and what we do, between logos and ethos. In other words,
Thoreau is saying that, if it is necessary to find our voice within the democratic discourse
and to claim our personal voice publicly, we must always remember that this voice can
never be dissociated from the practicing of what we claim within the framework of our
everyday life:
The question of democracy is really the question of voice. I must have a voice in my
history,  and  I  must  recognize  myself  in  what  my  society  says  or  shows  and
therefore,  somehow,  give  it  my  voice,  accept  that  it  speaks  in  my  name.
Disobedience is the necessary solution when there is dissonance: I do not hear myself
any longer, in a discourse that sounds false – an experience that each of us can daily
have.85
30 The question of democracy, then, is the question of the (harmonic or dissonant) relation
between  my  voice  and  political  discourse.  And  the  perfectionist  touchstone  of  this
relation is  represented by my capability of  assuming the responsibility for my voice,
which is possible only if I am able to establish a homologia between my voice and my
everyday  life  –  in  order  to  transfigure  the  latter,86 and  make  it  the  highest  practical 
example of the correct (true) use of the former. In this way, I  will  no longer feel the
temptation to speak by quoting the words of others, hiding behind imitation: “Man is timid
and  apologetic;  he  dares  not  say ‘I  think,’  ‘I  am,’  but  quotes  some  saint  or  sage.”87
Conformity will be overcome only as a result of our ethical work on ourselves, which
implies the establishment of a critical relation to others and the world (as it is). This is
why, according to Cavell, civil disobedience is how Thoreau names the “power to demand
the change of the world as a whole.”88
 
III. Conclusion
31 I  hope  to  have  shown  in  this  paper  how  modern  perfectionism  re-invented  ancient
perfectionism,  through  the  re-activation  of  the  imperative  to  pay  attention  to  our
ordinary words and everyday life  (and to their  harmonic relation),  linked to a truth
always  meant  as  a  practice.  Indeed,  in  modern  perfectionism  too,  truth  does  not
represent  the  final  and absolute  goal  of  human destiny,  nor  it  is  placed  within  the
(mental) framework of Cartesian evidence. On the contrary, like in ancient perfectionism,
truth emerges from the practical relation we are able to establish between our words and
our deeds: it is an ethical, rather than an epistemological truth – a truth-event that, to be
grasped (if ever such a thing is possible), requires the endless task of the work of oneself
on oneself. Hence, ancient and modern perfectionisms advocate the practice of a series of
specific ethical techniques, in order not to miss the importance of our ordinary words and
life.
32 Only within such a framework, I think, is the following claim by Emerson intelligible:
This conformity makes [most men] not false in a few particulars, authors of a few lies,
but false in all particulars. Their every truth is not quite true. Their two is not the real
two, their four not the real four; so that every word they say chagrins us and we
know not where to begin to set them right.89
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33 Both Iris Murdoch and Cora Diamond stress the fundamental role played by the work of
attention in our moral life, which is not “something that is switched off in between the
occurrence of explicit moral choices,” but rather “something that goes on continually.”
What is crucial is precisely “what happens in between such choices,” and it is here, at this
very level, that we can fully understand the importance of moral attention (and the risk
of moral inattention), since “I can only choose within the world I can see, in the moral
sense of ‘see’ which implies that clear vision is a result of moral imagination and moral
effort.”90 When it is a matter of our moral life, to give importance to attention, and to
improvisation,  means  to  give  importance  to  our  capability  of  seeing  the  details,  the
particulars,91 and “to struggle to make sense” of them. Indeed, moral thought does not
take place “in a situation with fixed, given possibilities”: on the contrary, through the
work of attention and improvisation, through “the exercise of creative imagination,” a
moral agent discovers himself capable of transforming the situation he thought to be
necessary in an adventure of personality.92
34 This  is  precisely  what  is  at  stake in (ancient  and modern)  moral  perfectionism.  The
necessity of acquiring a specific competence, which enables us to see an ordinary always
under our eyes, on the one hand, entails the transformation of our perception of things as
a result of the exercise of our creative imagination; on the other, it indicates our need for
someone who, thanks to his creative imagination, is able to show us things in a different
light – like Socrates in the Crito (Diamond), but also like the Cynics, like Thoreau and
Durruti,  through  their  practical  examples  of  ordinary  resistance.  In  fact,  though
philosophy tries always to break with the ordinary understood as the (illusory) natural
attitude of common sense, as the place of habits, prejudices and conformity par excellence,
93 such a rupture is never a mere refusal.  It  rather takes the (paradoxical)  form of a
militant acceptance,  since the ordinary is the ‘real’  of philosophy only when and if  it  is
transformed,  transfigured  by  it,  by  its  gaze  and  its  practices.94 The  (perfectionist)
philosopher always tries not to miss what matters,  i.e.  the ordinary dimension of  his
language and life; he tries to become responsible for it, assuming it as the real object of his
reflection and action – a hard task, as we have seen, always traversed by the ambiguity
and the uncanniness of the ordinary and, as a consequence, by the (necessary) menace of
skepticism.95
35 Thus, the perfectionist philosopher establishes his relation to ordinary language and life
as a relation of restlessness and alterity; and through the transformation of himself, of his
way of seeing and saying the world, and of his conduct, he constantly aims to use the
valorisation of the ordinary as the essential propellant for a positive transfiguration of the
ordinary itself. This transfiguration takes the form of the creation of a higher self, of a
new personal and social intelligibility, and of a world that is new and radically other.96 It
is what Cavell calls “the practice of the ordinary”:
Sharing the intuition that human existence stands in need not of reform but of
reformation, of a change that has the structure of a transfiguration, Wittgenstein’s
insight is that the ordinary has, and alone has, the power to move the ordinary, to
leave the human habitat habitable, the same transfigured.97
36 This is why moral perfectionism can be conceived and still practiced, today, as an ethics
and politics of responsibility, of attention to and care for the ordinary, engaged in an
“endless” but fully human struggle against skepticism – that is, against the temptation of
“empty[ing]  out  my  contribution to  words,  so  that  language  itself,  as  if  beyond me,
exclusively takes over the responsibility for meaning.”98 Perfectionism, understood as an
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ethicopolitical exercise of transfiguration of oneself, others and the entire world, aims to
bring together and harmonize words and life:  thus,  it  incites us to courageously and
openly assume the responsibility for our words, in the double sense of meaning and doing
what  we  say.  It  is  this  twofold  challenge  –  difficult,  experimental  and  always  to  be
renewed – that characterizes “perfectionism’s moral urgency” in both its ancient and its
modern form:
In Emerson’s way of speaking, “one day” (“Each philosopher […] has only done, as
by a delegate, what one day I can do for myself”) always also means today; the life
he urgently speaks for is one he forever says is not to be postponed. It is today that
you are to take the self on; today that you are to awaken and to consecrate yourself
to culture, specifically, to domesticate it gradually, which means bring it home, as
part, now, of your everyday life.99
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NOTES
1. Emerson (1841: 143).
2. Epictetus (1991: 11) (translation partially revised).
3. Foucault uses this expression to point at the “more or less coordinated set of exercises that are
available, recommended and even obligatory, and anyway utilizable by individuals in a moral,
philosophical and religious system in order to achieve a definitive spiritual objective,” i.e.  “a
certain transformation, a certain transfiguration of themselves as subjects,” (Foucault 1981-82:
398 (416-7)).
4. Cf. (Ibid.: 318 (334)). See also Foucault (1984b: 1532).
5. Cf. Hadot (1995: 271 (60)).
6. “La philosophie apparaissait ainsi comme un exercice de la pensée, de la volonté, de tout l’être,
pour essayer de parvenir à un état, la sagesse, qui était d’ailleurs presque inaccessible à l’homme.
La philosophie était une méthode de progrès spirituel qui exigeait une conversion radicale, une
transformation radicale de la manière d’être,” (Ibid.: 290 (265)).
7. Foucault (1981-82: 16 (15)).
8. Cf. Foucault (1984b: 1541).
9. Annas (1995: 27).
10. Emerson (1841: 143) (emphasis added).
11. Ibid.: 154.
12. Ibid.: 141.
13. Cf. Foucault (1984a: 134).
14. Foucault (1983a: 96).
15. Foucault (1984a: 134; my translation).
16. Foucault (1983a: 97).
17. Cf. Plato, Gorgias, 487E.
18. Foucault (1983a: 101).
19. Cf. Foucault (1984a: 138).
20. “Je n’en conclus pas qu’on peut dire n’importe quoi dans l’ordre de la théorie ;  mais,  au
contraire,  qu’il faut  avoir  une attitude exigeante,  prudente,  ‘expérimentale’;  il  faut  à  chaque
instant, pas à pas, confronter ce qu’on pense et ce qu’on dit à ce qu’on fait et ce qu’on est. […] La
clef  de  l’attitude politique personnelle  d’un philosophe,  ce  n’est  pas  à  ses  idées  qu’il  faut  la
demander, comme si elle pouvait s’en déduire, c’est à sa philosophie, comme vie, c’est à sa vie
philosophique, c’est à son ethos,” (Foucault 1983b: 1404-5 (374-5)).
21. Foucault (1984a: 119; my translation).
22. Cf. Lorenzini (2008: 83-8; 2010b: 475-80).
23. Cf. Foucault (1984a: 226, 247-8).
24. Foucault (1982-83: 315 (343)).
25. “Vivre  philosophiquement,  c’est  faire  en  sorte  –  par  l’ ethos  (la  manière  dont  on  vit),  la
manière dont on réagit (à telle situation, dans telle ou telle scène, quand on est confronté à telle
ou telle situation) et évidemment la doctrine que l’on enseigne – [de] montrer, sous tous ces
aspects et par ces trois véhicules (l’ethos de la scène, le kairos de la situation et puis la doctrine),
ce qu’est la vérité,” (Ibid.: 316 (344)).
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26. “[Le cynisme] fait de la forme de l’existence une condition essentielle pour le dire-vrai. Il fait
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ABSTRACTS
The central  argument of  this  paper is  that  moral  perfectionism cannot  be understood in its
radical philosophical, ethical and political dimensions unless we trace its tradition back to the
ancient  Greek  conception  of  philosophy  as  a  way  of  life.  Indeed,  in  ancient  Greece,  to  be  a
philosopher meant to give importance to everyday life and to pay attention to the details of
common language and behaviour, in order to actively transform oneself and one’s relationship to
others and to the world. Truth itself was conceived as an event emerging from the agreement
among the logoi of different people, or from the harmony established by an individual between
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his  words  and  his  deeds  (e.g.  Socrates,  the  Cynics).  But  this  way  of  conceiving  truth  and
practicing philosophy has been somehow put aside in modern times, and it has been renewed
only during the last two centuries, primarily thanks to the transcendental American philosophy
of Emerson and Thoreau. Therefore, the aim of this paper is to show how modern perfectionism
re-invented ancient perfectionism, through the re-activation of the imperative to pay attention
to our ordinary words and everyday life (and to their harmonic relation), linked to a truth always
meant as a practice. My conclusion will be that moral perfectionism can be conceived and still
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